Effect of the League of Nations on Disarmament and Peacekeeping

To what
extent was the League of Nations successful in achieving its aims of
disarmament and international peacekeeping?
Focus Questions:
What was the structure and aims of the League of Nations? What did the League do to achieve these aims and what was the result?What lasting legacy has the League’s actions left on modern international relations?

The former president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, advocated the need in his Fourteen Points of 1918 for a League of Nations to restore world peace. Draft statutes of the League’s Covenant were formulated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where there was a mutual goal in international peacekeeping and disarmament. It was inaugurated on the 10th January 1920, simultaneously with the Treaty of Versailles. The organisation was mostly successful in its dealings in the 1920s, but historians argue that there are a number of causes which resulted in the League’s dissolving into the United Nations in 1945, including the ineffectiveness during specific disputes due to the self-interest of nations, and its poor administration with unclear authority and peacekeeping force. Despite this, the League was quite successful in exercising its own power in resolving some conflicts and built the philosophy of internationalism for which the UN is built upon. Hence, there are many factors that must be considered in judging the extent of success of the League in achieving its aims, but it is the enduring impact that the League has left through the work of internal non-political agencies to enhance modern international relations that accentuate the organisation’s significance.
One of the factors that contributed to the League’s failure was its ineffectiveness during specific disputes. In particular, the Abyssinia crisis of 1935 was a key illustration of the reluctance from the major powers to act decisively in response to aggression. Fascist leader of Italy, Benito Mussolini, idealised a restoration of a Roman Empire, and justified his 1935 invasion of Abyssinia among other African states as he felt his people deserved a better life with more territory, which could not be achieved through the restrictions imposed by the League (Dennett & Dixon, 2008, p553). The League Council’s decision to impose economic sanctions on Italy was inadequate, as it did not restrict the use of oil, and the expansion regime of Mussolini that continued exemplifies a weakness of the League in appeasement exercised in an effort to deter nations from disturbing the peace, rather than forcefully enacting the articles of the Covenant and protecting the minorities who were more vulnerable to superior domination (United Nations, 2009). The reluctance of the powers of Britain and France to challenge Mussolini may have resulted from their desire to retain him as an ally against Germany’s Hitler rather than to incite more violence and disorder, as the League was criticised for their sanctions and level of authority over these smaller states (Lowe, 1982). However, it was only when Mussolini forced Britain and France to war that the powers acted so that Ethiopia could finally reclaim their rightful territory and maintain self-governance (United Nations, 2009). Theoretically, the League should have responded by imposing forceful penalties on Italy to force their surrender of their regime, as Ethiopia was a member state, but the League’s own objective of collective security that it was built upon was outweighed by the interests of France and Britain in maintaining the Treaty of Versailles (Merriman, 1996, p1221). Thus a flaw in the League was exposed through this notion of collective security, that although there was a call to act against Italy, the consequences for the Powers hesitating to act had to be equally taken into consideration with the various possibilities of what could eventuate. For instance, supporting collective security could force Mussolini to join Hitler, yet the rise of Japan and Hitler to dominate Asia and Europe respectively was inevitable, but the humanitarian responsibility to prevent aggression was disregarded, the prime concern in global peace (Murray, 1948, p192). Traynor explains (1988) A. J. P. Taylor’s statement cited in The Origins of the Second World War of 1961 that the German movement into the Rhineland “marked the end of the devices for security which had been set up after the First World War,” with the League “a shadow,” as the Locarno Pact was destroyed and Germany was able to rebuild their army. The only possible solution to this would be sending in forces to retake control of Rhineland, as sanctions as previously seen were ineffective, and a nonchalant approach as seen here inspired Hitler to continue his regime (Traynor, 1988, p32). The Manchuria crisis of 1931 expresses a further reluctance to hold liable and impose restrictions on powers, as Japan continued conflict and failed to withdraw their invasion despite Chinese appeals (United Nations, 2009). The establishment of the Lytton Commission to investigate was meaningless as Japan eventually withdrew from the League, and invaded China again in 1937 (League of Nations, 1937), with no intervention from  Britain or France because a trade boycott would undoubtedly result in war and increase devastation in their own countries (Lowe, 1982, p143). Conflict intensified in 1937 with the Japanese invasion of China, and the League of Nations was asked to intervene with Ecuador’s delegate Quevedo arguing (1937), “What hope can there be in similar cases in the future of help from the League of Nations for other weaker and less wealthy countries, in which other States do not stand to lose anything and have no special interests at stake?” The report delivered by the League’s Far East Advisory Committee to the Assembly condemned Japan’s occupation and promoted humanitarian support to China in restoring peace and independence (League of Nations, 1937), however as Japan was now a non-member, it had no overarching influence on them, and the Japanese Empire continued their aggression in their quest to dominate over Asia, taking over Hong Kong, Singapore and Indochina, and threatening the peace of Australia. Thus the League was seen somewhat as unsuccessful in achieving its aims due to the unclear methods of conflict resolution among powers that took into account the interest of all nations.

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Further, another influence for the eventual disintegration of the League was the poor
administration of the League and the poor interest from members or non-members.
For example, the non-participation of the United States despite the advocacy of
Wilson is a major contributor, because of the American desire for an
isolationist ideology away from conflict involvement, and the subsequent
inability to obtain the full support of his own party to pass the vote through
the majority of the Senate (Ostrower, 1996, p27). This was devastating to the
League as the United States could have had a major influence in making
important military and economic decisions and perhaps been more forceful in
delivering decisions regarding sanctions unlike that of Britain and France.
This was evidenced through the Russian revolutionary belief maintained by Lenin
and Trotsky that “peace must be made on a basis of no annexations and no
indemnities,” (Walters, 1960). In this way, it supports how the League’s
organisation and lack of movement by the leaders exposed it to its fall due to
relaxation in punishing offenders such as Hitler and Mussolini in order to
appease them and prevent the inevitable war (Walters, 1960). Further, the restriction
of Germany’s and the USSR’s participation in the League until a later stage and
their eventual withdrawal along with Japan is also important because it
highlights the overarching ideology of nationalism and sovereignty among the
stronger nations. It was this dominance that suppressed the focus on peace and
allowed the battlefront of warfare to initiate and take precedence over Europe
and Asia. In addition, there were flaws in the Covenant itself which
contradicted the purpose of collective security and prevented the League from
reaching its full potential in decision making (Lowe, 1982). The absence of a
sole-purpose peacekeeping force and the difficulty in reaching decisions unless
there is a unanimous agreement among members was unacceptable, but the Covenant
itself was difficult to amend due to the flaw in the voting process (Lowe,
1982). The Covenant was unrealistic in nations submitting to sacrificing their
independence in making foreign policy decisions to an international body, where
there was an undefined level of action to guarantee the safety of states, which
would be difficult for developing states (Dennett & Dixon, 2008, p554). For
example, Article 16 of the Covenant states that all members, when presented
with conflict, are all responsible for imposing force against an aggressor, but
an individual state would be incapable of challenging it, remaining vulnerable
to attack due to the reluctance of other states to protect it; yet minorities
that are protected are still under threat due to the lack of force that would
actually eventuate (Ostrower, 1996, p32). There was also a lack of common
beliefs among nations regarding the notion of peace: Germany wanted to use the
organisation so that the terms of the Versailles Treaty could be altered to suit
their own interest, Britain wanted to eventually incorporate Germany back into
Europe, while the French wanted the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty and
their military desires and Japan remaining generally uninterested (Ostrower,
1996, p115). This lack of consensus meant that Articles 10 to 16 of the
Covenant were void due to the inability to reach common grounds of agreement
between powers, and the ambiguous definition of authority within bodies of the
League made it difficult for the Assembly to resolve disputes with high
efficiency and the Council to be more influential in resolving Covenant
contraventions (Ostrower, 1996, p116). These flaws in the League were mostly
not in the control of the League itself, but through the influences of other
nations, as it could not force the US to join, expect countries to give up
sovereignty and sacrifice armies for collective security or please all the
interests of member nations, it would be an impossible feat as evidenced here
(Ostrower, 1996, p117). Therefore, as a result of these factors, the League of
Nations can be argued to have been somewhat unsuccessful.
On the contrary, one must acknowledge the various successes the League has had in its
contribution to a lasting legacy for modern international relations. One of the
successes of the League was in its work in the resolution of minor disputes.
For example, the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian conflict almost intensified into war, but
the appeal of Bulgaria to the League for action allowed a consensus to be
reached and for British, French and Italian forces to be deployed to enforce
the League’s order of an immediate ceasefire within 60 hours otherwise severe
sanctions would be imposed, which resulted in an end to the conflict (United
Nations, 2009). This was a monumental decision for the League as the dispute
between two members of its own was suppressed with unique urgency by the powers
to restore order and both parties allocated appropriate fault for their
actions, with Greece fined 45,000 pounds for breaching the Covenant, and
Bulgaria ordered to pay compensation for the death of an opposing militant, and
the allocation of two officers who were responsible for settling further
disputes (Scott, 1973 p130). In addition, the League was able to resolve
disputes between Sweden and Finland regarding the Aaland Islands in 1920, and
allowing the equal distribution of the Upper Silesia region between Germany and
Poland in 1921 before further escalation (United Nations, 2009). Also, the
League was successful in controlling the Saar territory for 15 years from its
formation, until the state obtained its right for self-governance in 1935, and
the maintenance of the Free City of Danzig with special harbour rights accessed
by Poland (United Nations, 2009). As historian Francis Walters states, “No
power could claim to be exempt from public debate on its external actions and
in this debate the smallest state had the same rights as the greatest,” and
revolutionised the idea of international relations after the Great War
(Traynor, 1988, p20). Thus, it can be seen how effective management of disputes
on a smaller scale allowed the League to flourish in the restoration of peace
and order.
Moreover, the League is seen to have been influential as it has shaped the philosophy of
internationalism which defines the current work of the United Nations.
The League’s structural organisation was
transformed through the formation of the United Nations, and lessons learned
from the poor administration of it were acknowledged so improvements could be
made accordingly. For example, the League Assembly was an annual meeting for
discussing issues concerning peace, altering the Covenant reform and electing
new members (United Nations, 2009), which then evolved into the corresponding
UN General Assembly, a parliament of nations with equal votes and can only make
proposals to cases for Council consideration if enough support is received
(Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p315). The League Council met 3 times
annually and were focused on taking measures to resolve conflict (United
Nations, 2009), but was transformed into the UN Security Council with the
similar goal of maintaining international peace and security, however decisions
were irrevocable, and the five permanent members had the power of veto to
reject any proposal that was not in the best interest of all as they have the
most influence in operations (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p313). The
League’s Permanent Secretariat worked as an administrator of international
relations in enacting treaties and investigating issues (United Nations, 2009),
whose role is similarly performed by the UN’s Secretariat (Baylis, Owens &
Smith, 2011, p315). The Permanent Court of International Justice was developed
for 15 judges to resolve and enforce any legal decisions regarding resolution
of conflict between nations and breach of international regulations (United
Nations, 2009), which has evolved into the work of the International Court of
Justice in the Hague (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p316). The Mandate
Commission created regulations to allow the controlling and growth of
developing nations under the power of developed states until they reached a
point of self-determination, such as Australia in control of New Guinea
(Hudson, 1980, p133). This work continues in the UN’s Trusteeship Council which
assists this same process for a state moving to self-governance (Baylis, Owens
& Smith, 2011, p316). Workers in the non-political agencies of the League
actively employed their expertise in making influential changes in the fields
of economics, health, law, finance, communications, refugees, labour and
international relations (Ostrower, 1996, p113). The Economic Committee was
responsible for resolving financial issues and reducing tariffs post WWI, as
seen in their provision of a £26 million loan to the Republic of Austria to
stabilise the budget of the newly-formed nation; while the Communications and
Transit Department explored issues concerning maritime, rail, roads, power and
communications (United Nations, 2009). The World Health Organisation for
developing vaccines and preventing transmission of serious epidemics; the
International Labour Organisation worked to improve working conditions for
those in the workforce; and a substantial amount of prisoners-of-war were
rescued after European conflict by a League Commission (United Nations, 2009).
These activities all highlight the organisation’s work towards a better world
for humanity and their relations with those in other nations, which continues
to occur through the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in implementing
initiatives surrounding current global issues of human rights, health,
urbanisation and refugees (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p316). In these
ways, it can be seen how the work of the United Nations is a direct benefit of
the underlying principles of the League of Nations.
One must also consider the important lessons that can be drawn from the League as they
have allowed for the development of international relations and can provide
inspiration for effective peacekeeping. The League was beneficial for Australia
itself as it notably advanced the nation’s involvement in international
relations and politics, growing in governing stature without any significant
pressure by the British influence to act beyond its desired level of
involvement (Hudson, 1980, p186-7). For example, the League of Nations Unions
promoted social movements despite the loss of public support for the League
itself (Burgess, 2016), as leaders endeavoured to enhance public understanding
of the League’s ideas, and build support to pressure the government in seeking
peace (International School History, 2011). Hence, the League was significant
as the annual assemblies inspired the government to take decisive action on
important policies, knowledgeable people became aware of the diversified
Australian foreign presence and of political circumstances in the surrounding
world so that they could pursue areas of concern (Hudson, 1980, p189). The
League allowed the development of Briand’s notion of a European Union to deal
with European affairs and promote free trade and movement within the region,
which remains in prevalence today as a positive source of international
cooperation (United Nations, 2009). The United Nations drew knowledge from the
ineffective League incorporation of treaties in policy, and developed their
Charter independent of agreements so that they could be successfully enforced,
and the Security Council has a broader authority to consider the expertise of
all with interest in the conflict, rather than the League Council’s general
focus on European matters (Goodrich, 1947). One can learn from the Corfu case
and the lack of power in Article 10 that if the Council came to a consensus and
the Powers were willing to resolve the dispute, there would be more confidence
in the League and perhaps political circumstances in Europe may have been
different, rather than the existent avoidance of the Powers which led to the
gradual weakening of power that it was unable to deal with a situation of the
magnitude of the Rhineland  (Bassett, 1930, p374). What also can be
learned from is the leadership of transitory Secretary-General Avenol in
contrast to the strength of predecessor Drummond in his optimism and positive
relations with staff; Avenol’s political inexperience was evident and made him
incompetent in making positive diplomatic decisions, only putting the patriotic
interest of France at the forefront of his agenda, which eventually led to his
voluntary resignation (Gill, 1996, p108-9). As renowned League historian
Francis Walters explains was the greatest weakness of the League (1960), “The
experts did not want it. The peoples were enthusiastically behind it: …” (p16).
He provides some further historical insight that when the Treaty of Versailles
was created, the international system was meant to prevent another Great War
from occurring, however the decision making and support of a League of Nations
was rushed into, without knowledge of effective international governance,
meaning that “their purposes were therefore liable to become uncertain and
confused” (Walters, 1960, p16). It was the lack of experience of the idea of
internationalism at the time that prevented the League from effectively acting
in times of hardship, but through the lessons learned of the League, the UN has
capitalised on the newfound understanding to work for a better world. For
example, the United Nations was effective in their ability to deploy
peacekeeping forces around the world, redevelop European relations and
defensive alliances, and provide initiatives for the arbitration of conflict,
despite the US and USSR powers being at the forefront of the Cold War
(Merriman, 1996, p1296). The UN experienced hardship through the post-WWII
partitioning of Palestine, as well as in the Congo and Somalia operations
(Townshend, 2011), however it has been realised that throughout history, any
international organisation will inevitably be threatened and face opposition,
and it is the gradual work in protecting human rights with appropriate force
applied in the specific circumstances which would generate desirable outcomes.
In a modern world where technological advancements and imperialism have forced
globalisation and the duality between independence and collaboration between
nations, resolution to conflict is essential in any form – arbitration,
armistice after war, imposing embargo, international operations or member
involvement using “all necessary means” to enforce decisions and maintain peace
(Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p106). Conflict resolution and peacekeeping
is critical, as an absence of order within one country can lead to
international disorder (Baylis, Owens & Smith, 2011, p317), and all
nations, especially those that are developed have the prime responsibility to
act and protect global peace in an age of extreme terrorism and political
uprising. Thus, it is the sense of internationalism which was virtually
non-existent prior to 1919 that is taken for granted in the modern world, as it
remains the underlying principle of existing legal and political systems for
many countries and the source of international cooperation.
Therefore, it can be seen that through the analysis of a variety of factors the League of Nations
can be assessed in its effectiveness in achieving its predestined objectives of
international peacekeeping and disarmament. In one sense, the League is viewed
by historians in its failure to reach a stage of global peace, as a result of
ineffective resolution of disputes including Manchuria, Abyssinia and the
Rhineland, poor management of the League through ambiguous authority defined in
the Covenant and a lack of motivated involvement from countries within or
outside of the League. Alternatively, one must acknowledge these flaws and
recognise its various successes which cannot be underestimated in their
significance. Despite its limitations, the League effectively resolved some
disputes and generated a sense of internationalism which paved the way for the
UN in shaping a better modern world, through the ongoing work of various agencies
that were developed including the Permanent International Court of Justice,
International Labour Organisation and World Health Organisation. Thus, it is
this foundation of cooperation between nations which the League has helped to
establish, that prevails as the answer to any question of dispute in
contemporary society which threatens to disturb international peace and order.
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